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报告编号：	9
作者编号：	20
上传时间：	2017/5/9 20:48:28
中文题目：	官员政治晋升影响地方国有企业并购行为研究
英文题目：	The Impact of Political Promotion on local State-Owned Enterprises’ Mergers and Acquisitions behaviour
合作老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	地方官员，晋升锦标赛，国有企业，并购
英文关键字：	local officials， promotion tournament， local state-owned enterprise， mergers and acquisitions
中文摘要：	在中国特殊政治经济背景下，官员之间为“政绩”展开的晋升锦标赛被认为是 理解政府激励与经济增长的关键。我国政府官员的绩效考核方式越来越多样化，客 观可靠的经济性指标成为了最重要的考核指标之一。以经济增长为基础的晋升锦 标赛将关心仕途的地方政府官员置于强力的激励之下，提供了官员发展地方经济 的政治和经济激励。而作为一把双刃剑，晋升锦标赛也产生了一系列负面效应，比 如只关注可量化的经济绩效如经济增长、财政税收等指标，导致决策短视化，区域 间恶性经济竞争、重复建设甚至产能过剩现象。经济分权和政治集权的双重约束为 地方官员致力于发展地方经济提供了强大的动力。在“向上负责”、以GDP 为基 础的政绩考核标准下，为了赢得“标尺竞争”，地方官员千方百计地制定各种政策、 招商引资，寻求一切可能的途径和来源来发展地方经济，并将政治和经济目标转嫁 到辖内微观经济主体中，干预企业的生产运营。中国式分权和晋升锦标赛提供了地 方官员干预企业行为的动力和能力，是导致企业出现行政型治理的重要原因。 并购重组是地方国有企业向混合所有制企业转型的重要途径和实现国有企业 做大做强的重要工具，地方政府和官员势必在其中扮演重要的角色。在特殊的市场 经济环境下，中国企业并购交易的动机不仅仅来自企业本身，还会受到地方政府和 官员的深刻影响，例如国有企业的并购交易需要迎合主管部门解决亏损企业问题、 解决财政的沉重负担和支持优势产业发展等要求，更为重要的是要创造出能够满 足官员晋升需要的“政绩”。基于此，本研究主要探讨市委书记政治晋升对地方国 有企业并购行为的影响，以更好地理解地方国有企业的并购行为和官员影响地方 经济的微观途径。本研究首先讨论地方官员晋升对企业并购目标选择偏好的影响， 在此基础上，研究地方官员晋升对并购交易过程的影响，分析地方国有企业是否会 在地方官员的晋升压力之下推进利于政治性目标的并购交易。最后从市场反应和 财务业绩两个维度检验地方官员晋升推动的企业并购所产生的经济后果。 本研究发现，地方官员的政治晋升会导致辖内企业并购交易的加速，表现为推 高辖内地方国有企业和民营企业当年实施并完成并购交易的概率、缩短企业并购 交易从宣告到完成经历的时间。从长远来看，政治晋升期间推进的并购交易表现出 经济上的低效率，表现为长期企业财务并购绩效显著恶化。而进一步的实证研究表 明在地方官员的晋升压力之下，其辖区内的地方国有企业明显倾向于进行大规模 的并购交易。虽然资本市场对这些交易在事件公告窗口期内有短暂的追捧，但是这 种显著正向异常收益实际来源于交易规模的中介效应。据此本研究认为地方官员 在晋升压力之下，会推动地方国有企业进行并购交易，且这些交易并非都出于企业 发展的考虑，而是有粉饰官员政绩的动机。 本研究的创新之处在于：首先，将地方政府干预企业并购的研究推进至官员层 面，有助于更好地理解官员影响经济增长的微观途径和国企并购的政治动因；其次， 引入政治因素的探讨能够丰富和拓展企业并购的相关理论研究，推动并购理论研 究关注非市场化因素特别是中国情境下政治因素的重要作用。本研究对于理解政 绩推动下的国企并购、防范国有资产流失、深化国有企业改革等具有一定的借鉴和 参考价值，同时还能够为规范地方政府行为、强化并购重组监管以及充分发挥市场 机制在并购重组过程中的主导作用提供政策建议。
英文摘要：	Under the special political and economic background of China, the promotion tournament between government officials is considered as the key to understanding the government incentive and economic growth. The way of performance evaluation of Chinese government officials is becoming more and more diversified, the objective and reliable economic indicators become one of the most important assessment indicators. Under the growth based Promotion Tournament will concern the career of local government officials in a strong incentive, provides the official economic development of local political and economic incentives. As a double-edged sword, the promotion tournament also produces a series of negative effects, such as focus on quantifiable economic performance such as economic growth, fiscal revenue and other indicators, which will result in short-sighted decision, regional vicious economic competition, repeated construction and even vicious economic overcapacity. The dual restraint of economic decentralization and political centralization is a powerful impetus for local officials to contribute on local economy development. Under the "responsibility upward" and GDP based political performance evaluation standards, in order to win the "yardstick competition", local officials will do everything try to make policies and attract investment, to seek all possible ways and sources for the development of local economy, therefore political and economic goals will be transferred into the micro economic subject, and enterprise production and operation will be intervented. Chinese style decentralization and promotion tournament provide local officials motivation and capacity to intervene corporate behavior, which is an important reason for the administrative corporate governance. Mergers and acquisitions is an important way to transform the local state-owned enterprises to the mixed ownership enterprises and an important tool to support the state-owned enterprises to get bigger and stronger, local government and officials are bound to play an important role during the process. Under the special environment of market economy, the mergers and acquisitions motivations for China enterprises are not only from the enterprise itself, but also being influenced by the local government and officials, for instance state-owned enterprises need to cater to the authorities to solve the coporate losses problem, solve the heavy financial burden and support the development of competitive industries, more important is to create to "performance" to meet the need of Abstract IV the promotion of officials’s promotion requirement via mergers and acquisitions. Based on this situation, this study mainly discusses the influence of the political promotion of the party committee secretary on the local state-owned enterprises’ mergers and acquisitions activities, in order to provide better understanding of the local state-owned enterprises mergers and acquisitions behavior and the micro way of officials’ influences on local economy. This study first investigates the influence of local officials' promotion on the target preference of mergers and acquisitions of local state-owned enterprises, study the local officials' promotion effect on the transaction process, and analyze whether the local state-owned enterprises will promote transactions which can benefit political goals under the pressure of local officials’ promotion. Finally, this study examine the economic consequences of mergers and acquisitions encouraged by local officials' promotion from two dimensions of market reaction and financial performance. The research findings of this study, the local official promotion will lead to accelerated mergers and acquisitions, to push up the jurisdiction of local state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in the implementation and completion probability, shorten the transaction time costed. In the long run, mergers and acquisitions under the political promotion influences peroform low economic efficiency with the performance of long-term corporate financial performance significantly worse. And further empirical research shows that under the pressure of local officials' promotion, the local state-owned enterprises are obviously inclined to conduct a large-scale mergers and acquisitions transactions. Although the capital market for these transactions in the event announcement window period has a brief celebration, but this is a significant positive abnormal returns results from the intermediary utility of actual transaction size. Therefore this research suggestes that local officials with promotion pressure, will promote the local state-owned enterprises mergers and acquisitions, while these transactions are not always originate from the development of enterprises, but contribute for official political achievement. The innovation of this research is: firstly, drive the research of local government intervention to the corporate merger and acquisition to level of officials, will help to understand the micro channel of officials' influence on economic growth and the political motivation of state-owned enterprises’ mergers and acquisitions activities. Secondly, the exploration with introduction of political factors can enrich and expand the relevant theoretical research of corporate mergers and acquisitions, and promote the study of the Abstract V theory study of mergers and acquistions to pay attention on non market factors, especially the important role of political factors in China. This study has a certain reference value for the understanding of state-owned enterprises mergers and acquisitions under the political performance promotion, preventing the loss of state assets, deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, and also can provides policy advices to regulate the behavior of local government, strengthen the supervision of mergers and acquisitions and give full play to the leading role of the market mechanism in the process of mergers and acquisitions.
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