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论文编号：	8377
作者编号：	2120142472
上传时间：	2016/6/8 15:06:59
中文题目：	高管股权激励对股利政策的影响研究——基于中国A股上市公司的实证检验
英文题目：	The Impact of Executive Equity Incentive On Dividend Policy—Based On The A-share Listed Companies
指导老师：	王永进
中文关键字：	股票期权激励；现金股利；股票股利；产权性质
英文关键字：	Equity incentive；Cash dividend；Stock dividend.；Property rights
中文摘要：	股权激励自上个世纪出现以来就在发达国家中被广泛应用，被认为是一种长期激励机制。《上市公司股权激励管理办法》（ 以下简称 《管理办法》 ）于2005年12月31日由中国证监会颁布，中国股权激励制度的大门才真正开启。该管理办法以及相关政策的出台和实施使得更多的上市公司通过股权激励的方式降低两权分离所带来的代理成本并提升企业的业绩。设计股权激励方案的初始目的是降低委托代理成本，缓解利益冲突。股利分配被认为是一种抑制代理成本的工具或者是成为管理者掠夺财富的一种方式，由此可以看出，股利分配与股权激励都反映了股东与高管的一种利益分配关系。获得股票期权的高管期望增加自己的期权价值，因而会希望提升公司股价或者利用股利政策降低行权价格，那么股利政策就成为高管可以获得超额利益进行操纵的工具。高管作为被激励的对象，由于股权激励方案指标设计宽松，极易获得期权激励，并且又通过对股利政策施加影响，依据信号传递及价格幻觉带来股价的上升。这样，高管就容易通过走捷径实现个人利益最大化的目的，而不是凭借个人的努力奋斗。因而，在中国股权激励背景下，股利分配倾向和水平是否和以前保持一致，高管是否会利用股利政策来为自己谋私利，这些都是值得探究的。在中国特殊的公司治理及外部环境下，研究现金股利支付水平及股票股利支付水平是否会受到股权激励制度的影响以及高管是否会在股利分配中采取机会主义行为为自己攫取利益具有重要意义。 本文选取2009年至2014年中国A股上市公司为样本，基于委托代理理论以及信号传递理论等，采取Logit模型、多元线性回归等方法，研究在中国的股权激励制度下，以股票期权为方式的股权激励对股利分配政策的影响，提出了股权激励对现金股利以及对股票股利两者分配倾向和水平均为正向影响的研究假设，同时进一步分析了在股权激励下国有企业和非国有企业两种不同产权性质的股利支付水平的差异。研究发现：（1）实施股权激励的公司与没有实施股权激励的公司进行比较，前者更偏向于进行现金股利支付；（2）实施股权激励的公司与没有实施股权激励的公司进行比较，前者更偏向于进行股票股利支付；（3）对于实施股权激励计划的公司，给予高管的激励强度越大，公司对现金股利的支付水平就越高，对股票股利的支付水平也越高；（4）与国有企业相比较，非国有企业对高管激励强度越大，现金股利的支付水平以及股票股利的支付水平都会越高。根据本文得出的研究结论，本研究进一步说明了本文的局限性与贡献，并给出了研究启示。 本研究的章节设置如下：第一章，是本文的导论部分，第一节阐述了股权激励研究的背景、研究目的以及意义，第二节主要介绍了本文的研究框架和研究方法。第二章，先进行了国内国外的相关文献综述，然后简述了股权激励和股利政策的相关内涵和分类。第三章，进行了理论基础的阐述，简述了本文的研究理论基础委托代理理论、信号传递理论以及价格幻觉假说等，同时阐述了股权激励制度背景，并理论分析了股权激励与股利分配政策之间存在的联系。第四章，进行研究设计，根据以前的研究成果以及相关的理论基础提出假设，并进行样本选择，说明样本来源，进行实证研究，得出股权激励对现金股利、股票股利的回归结果以及不同产权性质下，股权激励与股利分配政策二者关系的比较回归结果，接着进行稳健性检验，进一步探究结果的可靠性。第五章，得出研究结论，简述研究启示，并分析了本研究的局限性与贡献。
英文摘要：	Since it is widely used in developed countries, Equity incentive is regarded as a long-term incentive mechanism. On December 31, 2005, China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the "measures for the management of The listed company equity incentive" （referred to the "management method"）, the door of China's equity incentive system truly is opened. The management measures, related policies and implementation allow more listed companies through equity incentive to reduce agency cost and improve enterprise performance. With the coming of the modern listed corporation, the situation of "separation of two rights" becomes more and more serious. The purpose of Equity incentive is to reduce the agency cost, and eases the conflict of interest. Dividend distribution is considered a tool of inhibiting agent cost or is a way to plunder wealth for managers, thus it can be seen that dividend distribution and equity incentive reflect a relationship of profit distribution between shareholders and senior executives .So under the background of China’s equity incentive, whether equity incentive can truly play a role is a very important question. And we don’t have a conclusion if dividend distribution is consistent with previous level or not. With special corporate governance and external environment in China, executives will adopt opportunism behaviors in the dividend distribution for their own gain. The level of cash dividend payment and stock dividend will be affected. This paper is to explore the effect of equity incentive on dividend distribution policy. This article selects China's A-share listed companies as research samples from 2009 to 2014, and is based on the principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory and signaling theory. We take the multiple linear regression and other methods, and take research equity incentive’s effect on the distribution of dividend policy under the background of the system in China. And equity incentive proposed plays a role in the tendency and revel of cash dividend distribution and stock distribution. We analysis the differences of ownership natures at the same time between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. The study found that:（1）Compared with the companies which didn’t implement equity incentive, the companies which have implemented equity incentive prefer distribution of cash dividend and want to increase the level；（2）Compared with the companies which didn’t implement equity incentive, the companies which have implemented equity incentive prefer distribution of stock dividend and want to increase the level；（3）The higher the equity incentive intensity, the greater the level of cash dividend and stock dividend in companies；（4）Compared with the state-owned enterprises, the executive incentive intensity is bigger, the possibility of the level of cash dividend distribution and stock dividend distribution is higher. According to the research conclusion of this article, the paper further puts forward the limitations and contributions of this study, and gives the research revelation. The chapters of this study are as follows: the first chapter, introduction, the background and the significance of researching equity incentive and research purposes, research framework of this study, and research methods. The second chapter, the paper has carried on the literature review at home and abroad, at the same time, this paper expounds the definition of related concepts of equity incentive and the dividend policy. The third chapter has carried on the theoretical analysis, this paper briefly describes the theoretical basis of this paper the principal-agent theory, signaling theory and price illusion hypothesis, and expounds the relationship between the equity incentive and the dividend distribution policy. The fourth chapter, the study design, and related hypothesis are put forward. And sample selection, sample source, empirical research, finally robustness study. The fifth chapter, the research conclusions in the research, and the paper analyzed the deficiency and the contribution of this study.
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